The UK Supreme Court Cases on Penalty Clause Cases from a Dutch Perspective by Schelhaas, H.N. (Harriët)




The two recent UK Supreme Court decisions on penalty clauses attracted a great deal
of attention in both the English and international legal press. This is understandable
given the fact that the UK Supreme Court introduced a new test that made the law on
penalties simpler and less controversial than it had been in the past. These decisions
are remarkable given that Lord Dunedin’s old and controversial penalty test seems to
have been abandoned. It is no longer necessary to assess whether the agreed amount
is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss but it must be determined whether the clause is
out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party. These two
decisions made it clear that freedom of contract has become more important with
regard to the control of penalty clauses under UK law.
If it had been the Dutch Supreme Court that had to decide on the legal issues
of both cases, Dutch legal doctrine would not have regarded the outcomes of both
cases as remarkable. This is due to the fact that Dutch law takes a different approach
to the definition of a penalty clause and to the legal consequences of unfair penalty or
liquidated damages clauses. Before discussing both cases from a Dutch perspective,
I will provide a brief overview of the Dutch law on penalty clauses.
2. The Dutch Approach to Penalty Clauses
Historically, agreed payments for non-performance have two functions: to assess in
advance the likely loss suffered as a consequence of non-performance; and/or to
serve, by way of contractual punishment, to coerce the non-performing party to
perform his obligations by imposing a very high payment obligation in case of non-
performance.1 However, Dutch law generally accepts penalty clauses irrespective of
its function. A distinction between penalty clauses and liquidated damages clauses
is legally irrelevant and is therefore not being made; the concept of penalty clauses
(‘boetebeding’) refers to both.2 See Article 6:91 Dutch Civil Code (‘DCC’):
* Professor of Private Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Email: schelhaas@law.eur.nl
1 See for instance R. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations – Roman Foundations of the Civilian
Tradition (Oxford: OUP, 2nd edn 1996), p 95.
2 Herein, the common term ‘penalty clause’ or ‘contractual penalty’ refers in relation to Dutch law to
agreed payment clauses in general; that is, the English legal concepts penalty clauses and liqui-
dated damages clauses.
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Any stipulation which provides that a debtor, should he fail in the performance of
his obligation, must pay a sum of money or perform another prestation, is
considered to be a penalty clause, irrespective of whether this is to repair damage
or only to induce performance.
By generally acknowledging the validity of both functions of the penalty clause,
Dutch law essentially observes the principle of freedom of contract. However,
Dutch law also acknowledges that penalty clauses may have unfair consequences.
However, in contrast to English law, the unfairness of a penalty clause is no
obstacle to its enforcement, but the agreed payment may be modified by the
court if equity clearly requires it to do so. The court may not reduce or supplement
the contractual penalty ex officio but only upon demand of the debtor. This judicial
authority to modify penalty and liquidated damages clauses is formulated as follows
(Art. 6:94 DCC):
1. The court may reduce the stipulated penalty upon demand of the debtor if it is
evident that equity so requires; the court, however, may not award the creditor
less than the reparation of damage due by law for failure in the performance of
the obligation.
2. The court may award supplementary compensation upon the demand of the
creditor if it is evident that equity so requires, this compensation is in addition to
the stipulated penalty intended to replace reparation due by law.
3. Stipulations derogating from paragraph 1 are null.
According to the explanatory notes to this article, a court should be reluctant to
exercise its authority to modify a contractual penalty; the judicial authority to
reduce or supplement contractual penalties should only be used in exceptional
circumstances.3 In deciding whether or not to reduce or supplement contractual
penalties, all relevant circumstances may be taken into account, including the
amount of actual damages. The time of reference is ex post, which means that a
court may consider circumstances that occur after the non-performance. Article
6:94 DCC makes it clear that the court is not only authorized to reduce contractual
penalties, but is also allowed to supplement them. This is a consequence of the
provision that, as a starting point, the contractual penalty replaces the statutory
3 A.S. HARTKAMP & C.H. SIEBURGH, Mr. C. Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het
Nederlands burgerlijk recht. 6. Verbintenissenrecht - deel I, De verbintenis in het algemeen,
eerste gedeelte (Deventer: Kluwer, 15th edn 2016), no. 423; H.N. SCHELHAAS, Het boetebeding
in het Europese contractenrecht (Deventer: Kluwer 2004), p 80 ff and also Dutch Supreme
Court 27 April 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ6638, NJ (‘Nederlandse Jurisprudentie’) 2007, 262
(Intrahof/Bart Smit).
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damages unless parties agree otherwise (Art. 6:92 (2) DCC).4 This may result in a
contractual penalty that is lower than the amount of damages to which a party
would normally be entitled. In exceptional circumstances (‘if equity so requires’),
the court may award supplementary damages.
Under Dutch law, the contractual penalty not only replaces statutory
damages unless parties agree otherwise, but also provides that a claimant may
not generally demand both specific performance and payment of the contractual
penalty. Article 6:92 (1) DCC stipulates that a party must choose between
claiming specific performance of the primary obligation and the penalty. The
provisions on the relation of penalty clauses and other remedies are supplemen-
tary and only apply if parties do not agree otherwise. Therefore, parties may
agree that a party only relates to a delay in which case specific performance may
be claimed, or that the claimant is entitled to both the penalty and statutory
damages.5
Furthermore, Article 6:92 (3) DCC makes it clear that a contractual penalty
may only be claimed if the non-performance can be imputed to the debtor. Article
6:93 DCC lays down that generally a default notice is necessary in order to demand
payment. Again, both provisions contain supplementary law, so parties can make
their own arrangements in this respect.6
In sum, the Dutch approach to penalty clauses can be summarized as follows.
Under Dutch law, any stipulation as to agreed payment for non-performance is
binding, irrespective of whether the penalty clause is intended to assess damages
or to induce performance. The creditor is not obliged to prove that it has suffered any
loss. The contractual penalty can be claimed when the amount of agreed damages
exceeds the actual loss, or even when the creditor has not suffered any loss at all.
However, in exceptional circumstances, the court has the power to modify contrac-
tual penalties.
In addition, if a penalty clause forms part of the general conditions and the
debtor is a small-scale company or a consumer, the validity of a penalty clause has
to be determined by virtue of Article 6:233 (a) DCC and can be annulled if it is
unreasonably onerous to the other party. In a B2B transaction, both legal grounds
(reduction of a penalty clause under Art. 6:94 DCC and the invalidity under 6:233
(a) DCC) can be invoked. However, if the non-performing party is a consumer and
the transaction falls within the scope of the European Directive on Unfair Terms in
4 However, parties may derogate from this general rule and, for instance, provide that the contrac-
tual penalty is only a minimum or can be claimed irrespective of a claim for statutory damages: see
Art. 6:92 (1) DCC. See A.S. HARTKAMP & C.H. SIEBURGH, De verbintenis in het algemeen (6-I),
no. 423.
5 A.S. HARTKAMP & C.H. SIEBURGH, De verbintenis in het algemeen (6-I), no. 420–423.
6 H.N. SCHELHAAS, Het boetebeding in het Europese contractenrecht (2004), pp 264–273.
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Consumer Transactions, the court may not resort to the reduction of a penalty
clause, but must first test whether the clause is unfair.7
It is against this background that both UK Supreme Court cases will be
discussed from a Dutch perspective.
3. The Scope of the Rules on Penalty Clauses
In Cavendish v. Makdessi, the Supreme Court defined the rule on penalty clauses.
Makdessi sold a controlling stake in his company to Cavendish. The sale contract
included a restrictive duty against competing activities. Breach of that duty entitled
Cavendish to (1) withhold the final two instalments of the purchase price, and (2)
acquire Makdessi’s remaining stake in the company at a reduced price. The first
question that arose was whether these clauses had to be regarded as penalty clauses.
The Supreme Court decided that the true test for a penalty clause is:
whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a
detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest
of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation.8
Therefore, the penalty rule only applies to secondary obligations triggered by
breach of contract.
Under Dutch law, a clause qualifies as a penalty clause as soon as it provides
that a debtor must pay a sum of money or deliver another kind of performance in
case of breach of contract (see the definition in Art. 6:91 DCC). This definition has
two consequences in relation to the Cavendish v. Makdessi case.
First, it is not relevant whether a clause obliges one party to pay a sum of
money or deliver something else in case of non-performance: both clauses qualify as
penalty clauses. However, a clause that results in the withholding of sums that
already have been paid does not qualify as a penalty clause in the sense of Article
6:91 DCC because it does not oblige a party to actively deliver a new performance.
Dutch legal literature has criticized the fact that a penalty clause must result in a
new performance rather than a forfeiture of money that has already been paid. It
has been argued that if a non-performance triggers the payment or forfeiture of the
sum of money, both clauses essentially have the same result: the debtor loses a sum
of money that is fixed in advance.9 However, the parliamentary explanatory notes to
7 ECJ 30 May 2013, C-488/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:341 (Asbeek Brusse v. Johani). See in more detail:
para. 4 below.
8 UKSC 4 November 2015, Cavendish Square Holdings BV v. Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v. Beavis
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2015/67.html at para. 32.
9 A.S. HARTKAMP & C.H. SIEBURGH, De verbintenis in het algemeen (6-I), no. 416; H.N. SCHELHAAS, Het
boetebeding in het Europese contractenrecht (2004), pp 356–358.
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Article 6:91 DCC are clear on this issue10 and the Dutch Supreme court did not
decide otherwise. This means that in Dutch law the clause in the Cavendish v.
Makdessi case, as far as this entitled Cavendish to withhold the final two instal-
ments of the purchase price, does not qualify as a penalty clause. However, this
does not mean that the court is prevented from control on these kind of clauses. If
applying the clause would be unacceptable according to standards of reasonable-
ness and fairness, the clause cannot be invoked (Art. 6:248 (2) DCC) either in
whole or in part. This may result in a reduction of the forfeited sum of money.
Therefore, the qualification of a clause as a penalty clause is not as important as it
is under English law.
The second consequence is that Makdessi’s obligation to sell the remaining
stake in the company at a reduced price is most likely regarded as a penalty clause
under Dutch law. It obliges the debtor to do something other than pay a sum of
money in case of a non-performance, and therefore falls within the scope of the
definition of Article 6:91 DCC. The requested performance is detrimental to the
debtor: the price to be paid for the remaining stocks is reduced and does not
contain a compensation for goodwill and is therefore not ‘at arm’s length’. The
fact that this performance does not consist of performing a sum of money is
irrelevant; therefore, this detrimental performance qualifies as a penalty clause.11
However, it should be noted that the trigger for defining a clause as a penalty clause
is the non-performance. If parties draft their contractual duties differently and, for
instance, stipulate that the debtor has an option to pay a sum of money or do
something other than perform the duty not to compete, so that the creditor cannot
force the debtor to comply with its obligations, the clause will not be regarded as a
true penalty clause, However, analogous application of the provisions on penalty
clauses is possible.12 Likewise, if the contract is drafted in a way that the obligation
not to compete is not a legal enforceable obligation (for instance, ‘if the debtor
competes, the price will be adjusted’), the clause is not a penalty since it is not
triggered by a non-performance.
4. How to Control Penalty Clauses?
4.1 General
In Beavis v. ParkingEye, regarding a parking fee of approximately EUR 100
charged by ParkingEye to Beavis, it was beyond doubt that the law on penalties
was applicable. The same conclusion would have been drawn under Dutch law.
10 Parliamentary History of Book 6 DCC, p 321.
11 See also comment 7 (Dutch Law) to Art. 9:509 PECL, in: D. BUSCH, E.H. HONDIUS, H.J VAN KOOTEN,
H.N. SCHELHAAS & W.M. SCHRAMA (eds), The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law –
A Commentary (Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2002), p 431.
12 Parliamentary History Book 6 DCC, p 321.
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Payment of a fee for non-compliance with an obligation to remove your vehicle
within two hours after entrance of a car park undoubtedly falls within the scope of
Article 6:91 DCC. More interesting was the question of whether the clause
amounted to a penalty. According to the UK Supreme Court, it did not; among
the reasons for this decision were that (1) the charge was prominently displayed in
large letters at the entrance to the car park and at frequent intervals within it, (2)
ParkingEye had a legitimate interest to charge the fee, (3) the fee was not exorbi-
tant and unconscionable given the objectives of the charge (that is, facilitating the
efficient use of parking spaces and providing an income stream to meet the costs
and make a profit). Therefore, the penalty clause was enforceable in full.
Furthermore, the clause was not regarded as unfair under the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.
Dutch law recognizes two specific possibilities to control penalty clauses in
general conditions.13 If the non-performing party is a consumer, it must be
assessed whether the penalty clause was unreasonable onerous at the time of
contracting. As will be discussed later, the possibility to reduce a penalty clause
(Art. 6:94 DCC: see above) only applies here if circumstances arising after con-
cluding the contract trigger the unfairness of the penalty clause. In B2B relations
the non-performing party may choose the legal ground for attacking penalty
clauses, unless the non-performing party is a large-sized company: in this case
only Article 6:94 DCC applies.
I will first discuss the test for unfair general conditions, and then discuss the
specific possibility to reduce penalty clauses.
4.2 Unfair General Term Against Consumers
Under influence of the Directive 93/12 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Transactions, the Dutch court may not resort the specific mechanism to reduce
contractual penalties, but must first assess whether a penalty clause is unfair. This
follows from ECJ 30 May 2013, C-488/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:341 (Asbeek Brusse
v. Johani) where the Court of Appeal in Arnhem asked the European Court of
Justice:
whether Article 6 of the directive can be interpreted as meaning that it allows a
national court, in the case where it has established that a penalty clause is unfair,
instead of disapplying that clause, merely to mitigate the amount of the penalty
provided for by that clause, as it is authorised to do by the national law and as
the consumer has requested.
13 In addition, in all cases the general principle of reasonableness and fairness of Art. 6:248 (2) DCC
serves as a last resort. This general control mechanism, which applies to all contracts, will not be
discussed here.
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The European Court of Justice answered in the negative:
It follows that Article 6(1) of the directive cannot be interpreted as allowing the
national court, in the case where it establishes that a penalty clause in a contract
concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is unfair, to reduce the
amount of the penalty imposed on the consumer instead of excluding the applica-
tion of that clause in its entirety with regard to that consumer.
The European Court of Justice’s underlying reasoning is that reducing the
penalty clause rather than excluding the application of the clause altogether under-
mines the effet utile of the directive. Moreover, the fact that a reduction of penalty
clauses under Article 6:94 DCC requires a request by the non-performing party is
not compatible with the European principle that national courts have to assess ex
officio whether a clause is unfair or not.14
A decision on the question whether a clause is onerous depends on the
circumstances of the case, which makes it difficult to predict with certainty what a
court would decide in the Beavis v ParkingEye case. However, there are good
reasons to believe that a Dutch court would decide that the parking fee was not
onerous. First, the text of Article 6:233 sub a DCC accepts that based on facts and
circumstances at the time of contracting the following factors should be taken into
consideration: (1) the nature and the further content of the contract, (2) the
manner in which the conditions have arisen, (3) the mutually apparent interests
of the parties, and (4) other circumstances of the case. Like the UK Supreme
Court, a Dutch court would also take into consideration the legitimate interest of
ParkingEye, the fact that the charge was prominently displayed in large letters and
the fact that EUR 100 does not seem to be exorbitant. Case law of the European
Court of Justice makes it clear that it is the national court and not the European
court that must decide whether a clause is onerous or not.15
4.3 Enforceable Penalty Clause v. Moderation by a Court
If the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Transaction is not applicable, or if
the non-performing party relies on facts and circumstances ex post instead of at the
14 See, for instance: ECJ 26 October 2006, C-168/05, ECLI:EU:C:2006:675 (Mostazo Claro); ECJ 4
June 2009, C-243/08, C-243/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:350 (Pannon); ECJ 9 November 2010, C-137/
08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:659 (VB Pénzügyi Lízing).
15 See the Pannon-case, ECJ 4 June 2009, C-243/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:350: ‘It is for the national
court to determine whether a contractual term, such as that which is the subject-matter of the
dispute in the main proceedings, satisfies the criteria to be categorized as unfair within the
meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13.’ See, however, the directions in the Aziz-case, ECJ
14 March 2013, Case C-415/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:164. It falls beyond the scope of this case note
to analyse whether this clause would have been declared unfair under the Aziz viewpoints.
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conclusion of the contract16 or if it is a large-sized company that attacks the penalty
clause,17 then Article 6:94 DCC is applicable and the penalty can be reduced on
request of the debtor ‘if it is evident that equity so requires’. The Dutch Supreme
Court made it clear that this is a severe test that must be exercised with constraint
also in relation to consumers.18 Several relevant circumstance can be derived from
case law, such as the degree of fault, the nature and seriousness of the foreseeable
loss, the interests of the parties, and whether the clause was clear and explicitly
brought to the attention of the parties.19 Moreover, the difference between the
actual loss and the fixed amount is relevant, but only if the penalty is extravagant
and there is an enormous discrepancy with the actual damages.20 Against this
background, I consider it unlikely that a Dutch court would decide that the parking
fee has to be reduced since ‘equity requires so’. Again, it is relevant that ParkingEye
has a legitimate interest to charge the fee, the charge was prominently displayed,
and the charge is not excessive compared to a public parking fee (which amounts to
approximately EUR 50 or more than EUR 300 in case of a wheel clamp).
However, if the Dutch court would decide that the criterion of Article 6:94
DCC has been met, the consequence is different than under English law: the
penalty is still valid and enforceable, but the fee will only be reduced to a level
that is still well above the damages (if any) ParkingEye suffered.21
5. Conclusions
As follows from the above, a Dutch court would have qualified the Cavendish
payment obligations as a penalty clause. Moreover, a Dutch court would presum-
ably have reached the same result as the English court in relation to Mr. Beavis’
parking fee. This this leaves the question about the extent to which the English and
Dutch method still differ. There are indeed some important differences.
16 According to Art. 4 of the European directive, the ‘the unfairness of a contractual term shall be
assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was
concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances
attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another
contract on which it is dependent.’ This leaves national mechanisms where facts and circumstances
ex post are relevant fully applicable.
17 Art. 6:235 DCC excludes the control of onerous general conditions for legal persons who have
published annual accounts or where 50 or more persons are employed.
18 Dutch Supreme Court 13 July 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW4986, NJ (‘Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie’) 2012/459.
19 See in more detail: H.N. SCHELHAAS, Het boetebeding in het Europese contractenrecht (2004), p 85–102.
20 Dutch Supreme Court 11 February 2000, NJ (‘Nederlandse Jurisprudentie’) 2000, 277 (Kok/
Schoor); Dutch Supreme Court 27 April 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ6638, NJ (‘Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie’) 2007, 262 (Intrahof/Bart Smit).
21 See Art. 6:94 (1) DCC: the minimum is an amount that equals the damages due by law for non-
performance.
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First, if a penalty clause is included in general conditions and falls within the
scope of the European Directive, Dutch law does not apply specific penalty clause
rules but only assesses whether the clause is unfair and therefore invalid in the
sense of the directive.
Second, the scope of the rules on penalty clauses differ. Under Dutch law,
detrimental ‘secondary’ obligations that are triggered by non-performance are
classified as penalty clauses, which means that they fall within the scope of
Article 6:91 DCC and can therefore be modified by a court.
Third, Dutch law accepts, as a matter of principle, that penalties may have a
deterrent and ‘penalizing’ character, and therefore probably accepts penalty clauses
more easily than English law. This is demonstrated by the fact that Dutch courts
must explicitly exercise restraint in applying the power to modify penalty clauses.
Moreover, a pure penalty that allows the creditor to claim both the contractual
penalty and statutory damages is perfectly valid under Dutch law.
Fourth, even though the criterion used by the UK Supreme Court (‘out of all
proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party’) is now less strict than
the Dunlop rules (‘a genuine pre-estimate of loss’), it is still different than under
Dutch law (‘if equity requires so’). Even more importantly, the validity of the clause
under English law has to be assessed as of the time when the parties agreed on the
clause. Dutch law, by contrast, considers all facts and circumstances until the day of
the judgment relevant. This means, for instance, that subsequent behaviour and the
actual amount of damages are relevant factors under Dutch law.
Fifth, Dutch law is more flexible than the (new) English rules on penalty
clauses. Under English law, it is decisive whether a clause is a penalty clause or not.
If it is, it will be unenforceable in full. A Dutch court would only reduce a penalty
and leaves the essence of the clause alive. Therefore, the English law still accepts
the all-or-nothing approach under the old Dunlop case.
Put briefly, even though the UK Supreme court in the words of Giliker
‘marks an important turning point in the treatment of penalty clauses in England
and Wales’,22 there are still major differences between UK law and Dutch law.
22 See P. GILIKER, in her case note on English law in this issue.
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